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There is evidence of the emergence of a consensus amongst a number of States Parties 
to the BWC and NGOs on the principle of changing the process of S&T review as part of 
the wider quinquennial review process of the BWC. However, there is little evidence of 
agreement on the details of what needs to be done, how, by whom and to what end. 
Wrestling with these questions will be essential if state parties wish to capitalise on the 
momentum that has built up around changing S&T reviews and convert this into an 
evolution of the practice. With the review conference less than a year away, thinking 
needs to begin sooner, rather than later. 
 
 
Article XII of the Biological Weapons Convention instructs States Parties to the convention to hold, 
five years after entry into force, a conference to review the operation of the convention to assure 
that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the convention are being realised. This 
review, negotiators decided, should also “take into account any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention.” No further guidance is given to States Parties in the text 
of the Convention  
Strictly speaking the legal obligation to review the operation of the convention, including taking into 
account any new scientific and technological developments, was fulfilled in 1980. However, in 
practice what has happened is that at each of the following five review conferences (1986, 1991, 
1996, 2001-02 and 2006) a science and technology review has been conducted and what little 
additional guidance there is for States Parties has been issued in the Preparatory Committee 
documents which precede the review conferences.   
Especially in the last few years, concerns have been raised as to the adequacy of the current 
reviewing process. In 2008, for example, the Chairman of the BWC Meeting of States Parties 
reflected the findings of that year‟s Meeting of Experts in his Synthesis Document. Under the 
findings and recommendations for „oversight of science‟, he noted the finding that States Parties 
should  
Regularly review scientific and technological developments 
relevant to the Convention, and consider creating an international 
scientific advisory panel to independently analyze such 
developments.1 
                                                 
1 Chairman of the BWC Meeting of States Parties, Synthesis of considerations, lessons, perspectives, 
recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements working papers and 
interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting of Experts, 31 October 2008, BWC/MSP/2008/L.1, p6 
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The Chairman‟s synthesis demonstrates two recurring themes raised in relation to the current 
reviewing process: the review of science and technology is not conducted regularly enough and/or 
the process requires the establishment of a dedicated body, which will be charged with the task of 
reviewing science and technology relevant to the convention.   
Momentum building 
The 2008 Synthesis Document is part of a series of statements that have been made regarding the 
S&T review process throughout the life of the convention. In the Annex to this paper are two 
illustrative tables: the first is an illustrative list of statements made by States Parties in a BWC 
forum and the second is an illustrative list of statements from non governmental organisations or 
persons referring to the need to update or amend the process of S&T review.  
Both these tables show increasing momentum in support for the idea that „something‟ needs to be 
done regarding the way in which science and technology relevant to the convention is reviewed. A 
number of other trends are also worth highlighting. First is the wide geographical distribution of 
statements made by the States Parties to the BWC. These include statements by the UK, Argentina 
on behalf of the Latin America group, the Netherlands, Japan, the EU, Ukraine, Sweden, Canada 
on behalf of the JACKSNNZ, the NAM, China, India and the Russian Federation. Thus either 
through specific national statement or through association with a group statement, the profound 
majority of States Parties to the BWC have at some stage referred to the need to change the 
process by which the review of science and technology relevant to the convention is performed 
and/or to increase the frequency of such reviews.  
Second, State Party statements alluding to the need to elaborate, update or reform the process by 
which S&T review are conducted are not a recent phenomenon. Although the frequency of State 
Parties statements has increased since the collapse of the Protocol negotiations in 20012, 
statements have been made since at least 1979. In this earliest statement, the idea was put 
forward by the UK to form a small, open-ended group of experts to conduct the S&T review, 
supported by a Chairman and Secretary.3 This idea was repeated in 1986 with the proposal to 
establish “a group of scientific experts to study the latest biological developments of relevance to 
compliance with the Convention.”4  
Third, comments and statements about the process of reviewing S&T made by the non 
governmental community have an equally long history. For example, the Pugwash Executive 
Council issued a statement in 1980, which drew attention to the difficulties of performing a 
comprehensive S&T review because of the breadth of expertise required. The statement goes on: 
It would be essential, in our view, for the agenda of each 
successive review conference to include consideration of a report 
prepared by qualified experts in recent developments in pertinent 
areas of science and technology, including industrial microbiology 
and other forms of biotechnology. To be an adequate guide to 
policy such a report would need to draw from a wide range of 
expertise. Familiarity with, for example biological-warfare defence 
                                                 
2 During the Ad Hoc negotiations, the idea of a Science Advisory Board and ad hoc working groups of scientific 
experts were being explored for the proposed organisation. Early references can be found in the procedural report 
of the sixth session in March 1997 (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/34) with more detail being added in the procedural 
report of the seventh session in August 1997, (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36). 
3United Kingdom, “Preparatory Committee for the [First] Review Conference: Working Paper on Background 
Documentation” BWC/CONF.I/PC.3, 10th July 1979. 
4 Proposal by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, in UN (1980) 
Report of the Committee of the Whole, Addendum, BWC/CONF.II/9/Add.1, 29 September 1986, p 4 
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problems, relevant trends in industrial innovation and advances in 
basic theory should be required of those charged with preparation 
of this report… The Pugwash movement stands ready to assist in 
whatever fashion it can.5 
As well as offers of assistance to States Parties in their work, NGO contributions have suggested a 
variety of means by which relevant science and technology could be reviewed. Such suggestions 
include constituting a new body, such as a Science Advisory Panel, or creating a virtual network of 
scientific experts.6 There have also been offers of expertise from the relevant scientific communities 
to perform the review themselves and have their findings presented to States Parties7; and, more 
recently, a proposal for science and technology to be made a recurrent theme on the agenda for 
the annual meetings.8     
From statements to proposals: the need for the ‘thinkzone’ 
Such a geographical spread of statements all referring to the need to look again at the process of 
reviewing S&T relevant to the convention suggests that there is the potential to achieve consensus 
around changing the current process at the Seventh Review Conference. However, achieving 
consensus will depend upon the development of more detailed proposals upon which States 
Parties can forge agreement, and currently many of the statements calling for change in the S&T 
review process remain just that, statements of a general nature intended to encourage activity in 
the future. Indeed, in the majority of cases the statements from State Parties presented in the table 
are devoid of any details.  
With the Seventh Review Conference less than a year away, it will be important for states to enter 
into what has been termed „the BWC thinkzone‟ and give careful consideration to first order 
questions such as: 
 What is the purpose of reviewing science and technology relevant to the convention?  
 What output from this process do states parties wish to generate? 
Defining the end goal through consideration of these questions will be an essential part of ensuring 
success. Accordingly, time spent in the „thinkzone‟ is time well spent. Of the many potential paths 
which might be chosen to update and change the process by which science and technology is 
reviewed, this paper will concentrate on those two themes highlighted in Chairman‟s 2008 
Synthesis Paper both of which make a lot of sense.   
The first theme – that the reviews are not performed regularly enough – recognises how much the 
nature and pace of science and technology has changed since the convention entered into force. 
The current reviewing process, tied as it is to the Review Conference cycle, reflect the 
                                                 
5 Executive Committee of the Pugwash Council, Statement from the Executive Committee of the Pugwash council 
on the 1980 review conference on the Biological Weapons Convention, January 1980. 
6 In this regard, Nicholas Sims has been a prolific writer and advocate of the some form of dedicated body to 
review science and technology since the early 1980s. The illustrative table in the annex only records a small 
selection of his papers. See also VERTIC A new strategy: strengthening the biological weapons regime through 
modular mechanisms October 2006.  
7 See for example, Federation of American Scientists (1991) „Proposals for the Third Review conference of the 
Biological Weapons Convention”, Contemporary Security Policy, 12:2, September 1991; The Royal Society, 
Submission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, September 2002; The Royal Society, International  Council for Science (ICSU) and  the 
InterAcademy Panel on International Issues  (IAP), Scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention, September, 2006. 
8 See for example Sims, N Written evidence to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
Global Security: non-proliferation, 28th November 2008 
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understandings of science and technology prevalent at the time of the convention‟s entry into force: 
the pre-molecular-biology pace of change in science, the pre-biotechnology level of diffusion of 
technology in industry and a linear understanding of the relationship between science and technical 
change.9 The pace at which science advances and both scientific knowledge and technology 
disseminates has changed dramatically since 1975 and much has been written on how this relates 
to the current threat posed by biological weapons. Advances in the life science are leading some, 
for example to postulate the possibility of “the creation and production of new biological weapons 
and agents of biological terrorism possessing unique and dangerous but largely unpredictable 
characteristics”.10 Similarly, the spread of relevant technology is linked to increased risks as for 
example was postulated in the UK‟s recent Strategic Review, which states that the range of risks 
facing the UK such as “weapons of mass destruction, emerging technologies with potential military 
application, and the systems used to deploy them…” was “likely to worsen with the spread of 
technology over the coming years…. “.11 Combined, the pace of scientific advances and the speed 
of dissemination across the world, is leading to consensus that reviewing science and technology 
relevant to the BWC needs to occur more frequently than once every five years.  
The second theme - that a body should be created to review relevant science and technology - has 
equal merit as it reflects the increasing complexity of reviewing “scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention.” The increasing convergence of life sciences with other 
disciplines such as chemistry, IT and engineering means that the difficulties of performing a 
comprehensive S&T review have also increased. If a comprehensive review is the aim then a 
dedicated body of experts appears a logical choice. The proposal also has merit if one is attempting 
to overcome the low participation of States Parties in the review of science and technology and 
variability in content of those reviews submitted. The current process is begun by the instructions 
issued by the Preparatory Committee of each Review Conference which tend to invite States 
Parties, if they so wish, to provide a national paper on any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the convention.12 Despite all States Parties being invited to participate, 
the number of contributions to the S&T review process has never exceeded ten (as shown in the 
table below) with only Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States participating on each of 
the six occasions.  
                                                 
9 See Caitríona McLeish and Paul Nightingale “Biosecurity, Bioterrorism and the Governance of Science: the 
increasing convergence of science and security policy”, Research Policy, vol 36 no 10, December 2007, pp 1635-
1654 
10 National Academy of Sciences [US] “Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences”, National 
Academies Press. p17 
11 United Kingdom (2010) “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review”, 
Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty October 2010. pp 55.  
12 The actual wording used by the PrepComs has evolved over the past six review conferences. At the PrepCom 
for first Review Conference in July 1979 the Committee requested the depository governments prepare a single 
background paper on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the convention. The Secretary of 
the Committee then invited comments from any States Party on this background paper as well as inviting any 
State Party who wished to submit their views on scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention to do so. At the PrepCom for the Second Review Conference in April-May 1986 each of the depositary 
governments were requested to produce a review of developments in science and technology relevant to the 
Convention and any other State Party who wished to do so was also invited to conduct a similar review. No set of 
instructions was given by the PrepCom for the Third Review Conference in April 1991. At the PrepCom for the 
Fourth Review Conference in April 1996 any State Party that wished to do so, “including the Depositary 
Governments” was invited to submit to the Secretariat information on new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. The same language was issued by the PrepCom for the Fifth Review 
Conference in April 2001. For the first five review conferences the national statements were aggregated into a 
single document. At the PrepCom for the Sixth Review Conference it was decided to request the Secretariat to 
prepare six background information documents one of which was to be “a background information document on 
new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, to be compiled from information 
submitted by States Parties as well as from information provided by relevant international organisations.” 
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As the only guidance on what should be reviewed is contained in the words of Article XII, the style 
and content of national submission varies. Some contributions are country-specific activity reports, 
including nil submissions (i.e. nothing to report); other contributions refer only to biodefence 
activities; and others are meta-level reviews of relevant new developments in science and 
technology. A single body charged with producing a single product could help overcome these 
variances.  
Table 1: Number of contributions to the S&T review process 
REVIEW 
CONFERENCE  
NUMBER OF 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
STATES PARTIES 
1 3 
Depository governments, Hungary*, 
Sweden 
2 7 
Czechoslovakia*, Denmark*, Finland, 
Sweden, UK, USA, USSR  
3 9 
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark*, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
USA, USSR 
4 7 
Cuba, Finland*, Germany, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, USA 
5 5 
Bulgaria, South Africa, Sweden, UK, USA  
6 10  
Argentina, Australia, China, Czech 
Republic, Netherlands, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, UK, USA 
* A nil submission i.e. „nothing to report‟ 
However, both the notion of conducting reviews more frequently and/or the idea of constituting 
some form of a new review body generate a number of second order questions that need to be 
considered. For the purposes of illustrating the types of questions that will need to be addressed, 
the two themes will be taken separately but most questions asked would be equally valid if a 
combination of the two themes was thought appropriate.  
Increasing the frequency of reviews 
The convergence and deepening complexity of science and technology relevant to the convention 
suggests more frequent reviews would be more meaningful than what currently occurs. But how 
often would the reviews recur? Annual reviews or mid-cycle reviews, i.e. every 2.5 years? What 
form would the output of these more frequent reviews take: national submissions, national 
submissions aggregated into a single document or Implementation Support Unit background 
documents? Would the reports be overviews of relevant developments or subject orientated 
reviews? What additional resources would be needed by those who either author the national 
submissions, and/or author the ISU background papers? The authors for example, would need to 
have the necessary time and support to perform this task each year. In short, opting for more 
frequent reviews of science and technology would require working through issues such as:  
 What added value would more frequent reviews of science and technology achieve? 
 How often would the more frequent reviews occur? 
 Are the national S&T reviews submitted in the current process sufficiently useful to justify 
more frequent review? If not, what additional direction or components would be needed to 
make it more useful? 
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 Is the current number of national submissions satisfactory? If not what needs to be done to 
increase levels of participation?  
 What amendments would have to be made to the emerging process of holding 
intersessional meetings to accommodate more frequent science and technology reviews? 
 What additional resources are needed to realise more frequent reviews? 
Creating some form of S&T review body 
If the route of constituting a new body is pursued, then basic questions, such as „what form would 
this body take‟ and „how big would the body be‟, would have to be addressed. The former question 
is particularly important as an advisory body could either be formed by scientists appointed by 
States Parties or developed exogenous to the convention as an independent advisory board. 
Related to this point are issues concerning membership: who would be permitted to serve on either 
type of body, and perhaps more importantly, who would be excluded from service on this body and 
why? How would a quasi-government style of body avoid „groupthink‟? What status would any 
group - and their output - have to the States Parties and their meetings? Both types of body would 
also require resources from States Parties to perform their reviews, a carefully drawn mandate and 
greater clarity in the objectives of the review process. Finally, it will be important to give 
consideration to the limits of scientific advice and States Parties would have to accept that there are 
no guarantees that the experts on either review body will be able to agree a single „definitive‟ 
review of science and technology relevant to the convention. The nature of what is being reviewed 
revolves around incomplete knowledge and so plural and divergent views should be expected, 
raising the question of how such views will be incorporated in the outputs from such a group. In 
summary if states wish to opt for this approach they will need to consider second order questions 
such as:  
 What form would this body take?  
 Would it be a quasi-governmental or an independent advisory body?  
 Who would be appointed to the body? What qualifications are required? Who would be 
excluded and why?  
 Would equitable geographical representation on either style of board be desirable? 
 What would the mandate for such a group be? 
 Are the „scientists‟ going to be able to fulfil the requirements of States Parties?  
 What would be the required output and how would this be communicated States Parties?  
 What would be the relationship between either model of review body and States Parties?  
 How often would the body meet and who will provide the necessary resources? 
The purpose of presenting these considerations is to illustrate the sorts of thinking that will be 
needed to move from general statements about changing the practice of reviewing S&T in the BWC 
context, to concrete proposals. To assist States Parties in the time they spend in the „thinkzone‟, 
the Harvard Sussex Program is leading a project that is examining options for reforming the S&T 
review process. This project is funded by the UK‟s Economic and Social Research Council and falls 
under the RCUKs Global Uncertainties Project. Over the course of the next six months we will, 
amongst other things, be reviewing all the proposals that have thus far been put forward by States 
Parties and NGOs; assessing the feasibility of additional options suggested to us; and considering 
the potential of alternative models of S&T review which are in operation in other policy domains. To 
do this, we will be engaging with a sample of stakeholders from both the security and scientific 
communities through both interviews and questionnaires, gathering both quantitative and qualitative 
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data on the views and attitudes of stakeholders towards reforming the process. Part of our 
examination of each proposal will be thinking through what would be needed to operationalise any 
particular option: what structures and what resources will be required. The results of this work will 
be presented in special briefing papers that will be made available on our website 
http://hsp.sussex.ac.uk/sandtrevews and disseminated at conferences and workshops, including 
the PrepCom. Targeted journal papers will also be written.  
 
 
8 
Annex I 
 
Illustrative table: State Parties statements calling for changes to the S&T review process as 
made at BWC meetings 
 
DATE COUNTRY/GROUP DOCUMENT TITLE/REFERENCE 
10th July 1979 UK Preparatory Committee for the [First] Review Conference: Working Paper on 
Background Documentationº  
BWC/CONF.I/PC.3 
3 - 21 March 1980 Argentina Summary records of the eighth meeting of the First Review Conference 
BWC/CONF.I/SR.8  
29th September 
1986 
German Democratic 
Republic 
Proposal submitted by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the 
USSR, Report of the Committee of the Whole, Addendum, 
BWC/CONF.II/9/Add.1  
27 September 
1991 
Netherlands SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING 
26 October 2001 United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
Submission to the background paper on Science and Technology reviews 
BWC/CONF.V/4/Add.1 page 6 
19th November 
2001 
Canada Statement by His Excellency Christopher Westdal Ambassador and Permanent 
Representative to the Conference on Disarmament to the Fifth Review 
Conference 
26th November 
2001 
Japan Working paper by Japan BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.14 
27th November 
2001 
EU Proposals - Working paper submitted by the European Union, 
BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.23 
21 June 2005  Sweden Intervention reported in Annex 1Report of the Meeting of Experts, 
BWC/MSP/2005/MX/3 
10 April 2006 Canada  BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1 
26th April 2006 Ukraine Statement by Ambassador Bersheda, Permanent Representative of Ukraine in 
Geneva 
20th October 2006 Argentina “Follow up mechanism”, Argentina on behalf of , Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru And 
Uruguay., BWC/CONF.VI/WP.11 
28th November 
2006 
NAM “Intersessional Ad Hoc mechanism to be established between the sixth and 
seventh review conferences of the BWC”, BWC/CONF.VI/WP.32 
20th November 
2006 
EU Statement by H.E. Markus Lyra Under-Secretary of State Finland, on behalf of 
the European Union to the Sixth Review Conference of States Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
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(BTWC) 
20th November 
2006 
Ukraine Statement by the delegation of Ukraine to the Sixth Review Conference Sixth 
Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
6th December 
2006 
China, India Article XII Proposals, as noted in the Report of the Committee of the Whole 
BWC/CONF.VI/3 
20th October 2008 Canada “Accountability Framework”, BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1 
1st December 
2008 
Russian Federation Statement by Ambassador Ioshchinin, head of the delegation of the Russian 
Federation, permanent representative of the Russian Federation at the Meeting 
of States Parties 
7 December 2009 Canada  “Policy issues for the Seventh Review Conference”, submitted by Canada on 
behalf of the JACKSNNZ BWC/MSP/2009/WP.4  
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Illustrative table: Statements by civil society calling for changes to the BWC‟s S&T review 
process 
 
DATE PERSON/GROUP DOCUMENT TITLE/REFERENCE 
January 1980  Pugwash   Statement from the Executive Committee of the Pugwash council on the 1980 
review conference on the Biological Weapons Convention 
1986 Richard Falk “Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972”  in Geissler, E (ed) 
Biological and toxin weapons today OUP 
24 September 
1986 
International Council of 
Scientific Unions 
Press release at the BWC Second Review Conference 
September 1990 Herbert Marcovich “Annexe 6. Proposal for an international biological monitoring agency”, in 
Geissler E (ed) Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by 
Confidence-Building Measures, Scorpion Paper no 10, SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies 
Winter 1990 Charles Flowerree “On tending arms control agreements” The Washington Quarterly 
2 June 1991 Nicholas Sims, London 
School of 
Economics(LSE)13 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: proposals for the Third 
Review Conference QUNO Geneva: Quaker Residential Conference for 
Diplomats, 31 May-2 June 1991 Château de Bossey 
September 1991 Federation of American 
Scientists 
“Proposals for the Third Review conference of the biological Weapons 
Convention”, Contemporary Security Policy vol12 no2  
September 2001 Nicholas Sims, LSE  “Nurturing the BWC: agenda for the Fifth Review Conference and beyond”, 
CBW Conventions Bulletin no 53, September 2001 
September 2002 The Royal Society Royal Society Submission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green 
Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
October 2006 VERTIC A new strategy: strengthening the biological weapons regime through modular 
mechanisms 
September 2006 The Royal Society, 
International Council for 
Science (ICSU) and the 
InterAcademy Panel on 
International Issues (IAP) 
Scientific and technological developments relevant to the Biological & Toxin 
Weapons Convention 
September 2006 Nicholas A. Sims and 
Graham S. Pearson,  
“ARTICLE XII:  Review Conferences”, Key Points for the Sixth Review 
Conference. 
November 2006 Jean Pascal Zanders and 
Kathryn Nixdorff 
“Enforcing non-proliferation: the European Union and the 2006 BTWC Review 
Conference”, Chaillot Paper no 93 
November 2006 Royal Society S&T developments relevant to the BTWC RS policy document 38(06) 
October 2007 Catherine Rhodes and “Options for a Scientific Advisory Panel for the Biological Weapons 
                                                 
13 Nicholas Sims has been a prolific writer on the institutional deficit of the BWC. Only some of his writings are 
included in this table. For a more detailed list of papers please contact the authors of this discussion paper.  
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Malcolm Dando Convention”, in Brian Rappert and Caitríona McLeish (eds) A Web of 
Prevention - Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of 
Research. EarthScan 
10th December 
2007 
International Network of 
Engineers and Scientists 
for Global Responsibility 
(INES) 
Practical Contributions that Civil Society can make to National Implementation 
and Regional Cooperation, Participation in the NGO roundtable discussions 
with the Chair, Meeting of States Parties, Geneva  
16th November 
2008  
Daniel Feakes, The 
Harvard Sussex Program 
Written evidence to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee, Global Security: non-proliferation  
2009 Nicholas Sims, LSE The future of biological disarmament: strengthening the treaty ban on weapons, 
Routledge 
June 2010 Nicholas Sims, LSE “An annual meeting for the BTWC”, Bradford Review Conference Paper no 22 
 
